Iraq plans Waze ban over Israeli origins, with replacement details unclear

Iraq plans to ban the navigation app Waze at the beginning of 2027 because of its Israeli origins, Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad told Rudaw in Erbil on October 6. The proposed block would affect motorists who use its live traffic reports, including taxi drivers, while details of enforcement and a domestic replacement remain unresolved.

Al Jazeera’s October 9 report describes an alternative timetable, attributed to Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada, of blocking Waze by the end of December. The accounts place the intended change around the turn of the year, but do not establish a precise, reconciled implementation date. The announcement does not establish that a block is already in force.

When Iraq intends to block Waze

“We will ban the usage of the application in Iraq at the beginning of 2027,” Sanad told Rudaw’s Nushin Heme. He spoke on the sidelines of the Hitex 2026 technology exhibition in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

Sanad described Waze as widely used in Iraq and suggested Google Maps and domestic navigation systems as alternatives, according to Rudaw’s interview. The report provides no verified user count, and the scale of any disruption to journeys or taxi services has not been quantified.

What is known about Iraq’s proposed replacement

Communications Ministry spokesman Omar al-Amiri said an Iraqi application would replace Waze and operate without technical problems, according to remarks carried by Al-Mada and relayed by Al Jazeera. That is a ministry assurance; the reporting does not establish an independently tested replacement or identify its launch date.

Technology researcher Mustafa Kamel al-Sharif, also quoted by Al-Mada in Al Jazeera’s account, described the requirements for an effective domestic service: accurate geographic databases, continually updated roads, routing systems and live information about traffic, accidents and closures. The proposed application’s name, capabilities and privacy policy remain unknown.

Google Maps presents a separate unanswered question. Sanad recommended it even though Google also owns Waze. Al Jazeera identifies that shared ownership as an unresolved issue in the government’s reasoning, alongside the question of why authorities are acting now.

What Waze says about location data

Waze’s privacy policy describes collecting detailed location and journey information, including timestamped GPS and sensor data, and saving route histories. Collection depends partly on device and account settings. The company says this information supports navigation, traffic alerts and improvements to mapping accuracy.

Depending on settings, location collection can continue when the application is not being used, supporting departure reminders, traffic notifications and parking assistance. Its Invisible Mode hides users from the map but does not stop Waze collecting location and route information, according to the policy.

The policy also describes sharing de-identified location and route information with other Google mapping services and permits personal-information sharing with Google affiliates. Waze says it does not sell, rent or lease personal information, while specifying circumstances permitting disclosure, including legal requirements and service operations.

These disclosures explain Waze’s stated practices; they are not a company response to the Iraqi announcement. They do not establish misuse of data or Israeli government access. Al-Sharif argued that regulation of citizens’ data is central because other services can collect similarly sensitive information, according to Al Jazeera’s account.

Legal basis and enforcement remain unspecified

Iraq does not recognise Israel. A 2022 Iraqi law criminalises diplomatic, political, military, economic and cultural ties with it, but Sanad has not specifically identified that law as the legal basis for blocking Waze, Al Jazeera reports. The distinction leaves the legal mechanism for this particular measure unresolved.

Al Jazeera reports that enforcement arrangements and coverage of the Kurdistan Region remain unspecified. Its account also leaves the domestic application’s launch schedule open. A precise implementation order and identification of the replacement would clarify how the announced policy is intended to work; the reporting does not establish that switching services would improve users’ privacy.